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Abstract
This article discusses how sensitive bioethical issues are addressed in legislation, 
using as a starting point the analysis of a corpus of normative texts relating to 
Assisted Reproduction Technologies (ARTs), and in particular surrogacy, enacted 
in various English-speaking countries. In the investigation, special special atten-
tion is given to the re-elaboration and presentation of scientific knowledge in legal 
discourse with a view to detecting any possible slant or changes, and the reasons 
thereof. Another important object of investigation is the redefinition of certain well 
established categories of kinship because of the disruptive effects of biomediacal 
advances, and ARTs in particular, on family-based social relations. The analysis 
will focus on legal definitions, which are crucial in this domain considering that 
advances in the modern technosciences have brought about the need to categorize 
and name new medical practices and the situations they contribute to bringing 
about. The focus will be on how definitions are used in normative texts, functioning 
as initiators of a dynamic process generating discourses that acquire their meaning 
in the social and communicative contexts they are embedded in. Special attention 
will be devoted to the way in which specialised scientific, and especially medical, 
terminology and concepts, are dealt with in bioethically relevant legal discourse.
Keywords: Artificial Reproduction Technologies; bioethics; definitions; legislative 
drafting; surrogacy.
 * This article contributes to the national research programme “Knowledge dissemina-
tion across media in English: Continuity and change in discourse strategies, ideologies, and 
epistemologies”, financed by the Italian Ministry of Education, University and Research for 
2017-2019 (nr. 2015TJ8ZAS).
Giuliana Elena Garzone
10
Lingue Culture Mediazioni / Languages Cultures Mediation – 5 (2018) 1
http://www.ledonline.it/LCM-Journal/
1. Introduction
In the last few decades technoscientific research has gathered momentum 
and broken out of the laboratory into our lives, with important implica-
tions in some areas (health, genetics, reproduction, end of life, etc.), often 
introducing an element of choice in facts that were previously ineluctable 
(death, the sexual basis of reproduction, congenital malformations, etc.), 
and in many cases also having an impact on the environment. So the need 
has arisen to introduce some form of social control: it seems no longer 
possible for science to stand apart and let scientific research proceed in 
the free pursuit of knowledge and its applications in full autonomy and 
independently of the social context where it is embedded. In this respect 
the law has a most crucial role to play as the instrument through which 
social control can be exerted, establishing rules, i.e. limitations, if not out-
right prohibitions, for activities in the biomedical and life sciences and in 
individuals’ behaviour (cf. Mazzoni 2002, 7). 
In the past there was little confidence that the law would be a valid 
instrument to regulate bioethical questions, because of the sheer speed of 
technological and biomedical progress, and the difficulty unifying largely 
divergent moral and religious conceptions (Tallacchini 2002, 79). Some 
people also thought that for many of the issues involved the choice could be 
left to the single individual, rather than determined by the institutions. But 
the problems deriving from a lack of rules in the bioethical field were so 
serious that law-making seemed to be the only possible solution, apart from 
the contingent (and unsystematic) solutions provided by judgments issued 
in court cases where disputes often ended up because of lack of clear rules.
Of course, the pace at which the biomedical sciences have progressed 
has put legal systems under strain to come to terms with progress and 
regulate the new situations and options. The legislative work done in each 
community for this purpose has important ideological consequences, as 
not only does it determine what is prescribed or prohibited, but it also 
entails the designation and definition of the entities and objects involved. 
This means it plays a crucial role in the categorization of such entities and 
objects, and in the establishment of connections amongst them. Knowl-
edge thus categorized is then disseminated through the circulation of the 
contents of legislative instruments and their application in civil life, and 
becomes widely accepted in society, thus offering schemes for the social 
construction of reality. 
This study is aimed at discussing how sensitive bioethical issues, and in 
particular those connected sith surrogacy, are addressed in relevant legisla-
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tion in English, giving special attention to definition rules (Gunnarsson 
1984) on account of their importance for the sake of the conceptualisation 
of scientific/bioethical knowledge.
2. Background: surrogacy and the law
Among bioethical issues, those regarding Assisted Reproduction Tech-
nologies (ARTs) are especially topical. 
Various forms of IVF (In Vitro Fertilisation), gamete intrafallopian 
transfer (GIFT), homologous and heterologous insemination, cloning, 
have often been objects of debate both on an institutional level and among 
the general public. In particular, since surrogacy was introduced in the 
1980s 1, in many countries the issue of its admissibility has been especially 
controversial, well beyond a general reluctance towards techniques that 
tamper with the mechanisms of human reproduction.
For surrogacy, the sources of concern are manifold. Surrogacy, espe-
cially in its gestational form, i.e when the surrogate mother has no genetic 
connection with the baby 2, may lead to complex genetic and biological 
situations in terms of maternity/paternity recognition, which in some 
cases even DNA testing cannot sort out (as was the case for instance in 
the famous baby M case, or the Johnson v. Calvert, 1993 case, or Jaycee v. 
Supreme Court of Orange County, 1996; cf. Post 2004, 2291-2292) 3 and 
this often leads to court battles.
How controversial the practice of surrogacy continues to be is proved 
by the fact that in various jurisdictions where commercial surrogacy was 
allowed until recently (e.g. India, Thailand, Tabasco), more restrictive laws 
have now been introduced to prevent non-nationals from having access to 
 1 The first known case of surrogacy with IVF was recorded in 1985 (cf. Utian et al. 
1985). However, the first surrogacy agreement dates back to 1976 (http://information-on-
surrogacy.com/history-of-surrogacy [25/08/2017]).
 2 In gestational surrogacy the surrogate mother has no biological link with the baby, 
as the embryo is created using either the eggs and sperm of the commissioning parents, or 
a donated egg fertilised with sperm of the commissioning father, or eggs and sperm from 
donors, while in traditional surrogacy the substitute mother is artificially inseminated with 
the sperm of the aspiring father, lending her own ovum.
 3 The judgements can be found respectively at https://law.justia.com/cases/california/
supreme-court/4th/5/84.html and http://law.justia.com/cases/california/court-of-appeal/
4th/42/718.html [10/02/2017].
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it. The resulting picture is one where in an increasing number of countries 
the practice of commercial surrogacy is either forbidden by law or subject 
to heavy restrictions. More in general, while certain sectors of public opin-
ion (e.g. LGBT communities) strongly advocate its legalization, surrogacy 
has come under serious scrutiny in various quarters, e.g. feminist groups, 
who after initially seeing surrogacy as an expression of women’s control of 
their own bodies now denounce it as a form of exploitation and commodi-
fication orchestrated by the human reproduction industry. A case in point 
is the Charter for the Abolition of Surrogate Motherhood (http://www.
abolition-gpa.org/charte/english/ [24/08/2017]) launched in 2016 by a 
composite group of feminist associations and subsequently promoted glob-
ally through a series of conferences. Noteworthy are also stances taken by 
institutions, such as the European Parliament (cf. condemnation included 
in the 2014 Report on Human Rights) 4, and the Council of Europe’s Social 
Affairs and Health Committee’s rejection of the draft report on surrogacy 
(‘de Sutter report’) containing a proposal that called for measures which 
would have required states to give effect to private surrogacy arrangements 
(11/10/2017).
At the same time in ever more jurisdictions increasing tolerance is 
shown, for instance when actual cases end up in court in countries that ban 
surrogacy, and the judges recognise the baby born abroad from surrogacy 
as the legitimate offspring of the commissioning couple on the basis of the 
principle of the best interest of the child. In other countries measures have 
been passed to legalize altruistic or collaborative surrogacy, also for the 
purpose of avoiding mispractices and abuses.
A further source of concern is that where commercial surrogacy is 
actually practiced, being allowed or tolerated, it is often seen to take the 
form of a real business, being mostly carried out within the framework of 
organizations or ‘centres’ that provide services (the surrogate motherhood) 
and goods (the babies) in addition to a whole range of supplementary 
goods and services (ova, sperm, embryos, in vitro fertilization services, 
 4 Cf. clause 114 of the Annual Report on Human Rights and Democracy in the World 
2014 and the European Union’s Policy on the Matter passed 17/12/2015: “Condemns the 
practice of surrogacy, which undermines the human dignity of the woman since her body 
and its reproductive functions are used as a commodity; considers that the practice of ges-
tational surrogacy which involves reproductive exploitation and use of the human body for 
financial or other gain, in particular in the case of vulnerable women in developing coun-
tries, shall be prohibited and treated as a matter of urgency in human rights instruments” 
(http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P8-TA-2015-
0470&language=EN&ring=A8-2015-0344 [24/08/2017]).
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etc.), which are specialised in assisting aspiring parents through the whole 
surrogacy cycle, and offer medical and legal counselling, reproductive 
technologies, concierge services for pregnant surrogate mothers, etc.
But, whatever one’s opinion on the admissibility and/or lawfulness of 
surrogacy, it cannot be ignored that this practice is part of the unprec-
edented advances made in the biomedical and genetic sphere that have had 
an impact on our conceptualisation of the possible interferences in the 
natural functioning of the body: ARTs, genetic therapies, organ transplant 
and end of life care are only few examples. These advances have revolution-
ized our conceptualisation of the body as a non sectionable organism, with 
a number of consequences, among them the confidence in the possibility 
of tampering with various body parts and replacing them without interfer-
ing with the overall functioning of the organism. This may even give rise 
to a conceptualisation of body parts as spare parts that can be exchanged, 
removed, and sold, patently against the principle of non-commercialization 
of human organs as enshrined in professional statements, such as the 
Declaration of Istanbul (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/
PMC2813140/) (2008), and international legal instruments, such as the 
Council of Europe Convention against Organ Trafficking (2014).
It is inevitable that such important developments should bring about 
profound changes in mentality, altering communities’ ethical convictions 
as well as their conceptualisations of some of the basic aspects of human 
life. In particular, as regards surrogacy, the acceptance of the practice and 
all the corollaries it brings with it entails a radical re-haul of current con-
ceptions of the fundamental facts of life based on strictly biological laws in 
their ‘natural’ course. This is of course especially true for surrogacy, where 
the new options and their consequences diverge from biologically-based 
and socially-sanctioned kinship relations. 
3. Aims, materials and method
This study looks at surrogacy laws in force in some English-speaking 
countries and aims at understanding how practices and situations made 
possible by advances in the modern biomedical sciences are categorized 
and named within legislative texts. The focus is on definitions, which 
are crucial in this respect, functioning as initiators of a dynamic process 
generating discourses that acquire their meaning in the social and com-
municative contexts they are embedded in. Special attention is devoted to 
Giuliana Elena Garzone
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the way in which specialised scientific, and especially medical, terminology 
and concepts, are dealt with in bioethically relevant legal discourse. 
The study has its starting point in the analysis of a corpus of surrogacy 
laws in force in English speaking countries. As regards corpus collection, 
it has to be considered that normative texts in English regulating the issue 
are not numerous, as only some states have actually introduced legislation 
to control or prohibit surrogacy, either totally or partially, while in other 
countries the practice is not subject to any control or tolerated, or it is 
left to the judges to decide on its lawfulness in contingent cases they are 
required to deliberate on. Therefore, the choice of texts for the corpus was 
rather limited, and includes statutes in force in the UK, Canada, South 
Africa, Hong Kong, the United States and Australia. Given that in the 
USA and in Australia, each state (or territory) has a different surrogacy or 
ART law, in order to prevent an excessive weight of American and Aus-
tralian texts in the corpus only a selection has been included, taking care 
that the statutes selected are characterised by different stances towards the 
issue. The resulting corpus comprises the laws in force in the UK, Canada, 
South Africa, Hong Kong, seven statutes in force in US States (California, 
Florida, Illinois, Lousiana, Michigan, Virginia, Washington), and three 
statutes from Australian States (New South Wales, Victoria, West Aus-
tralia). The corpus consists of 65,396 tokens, standardised TTR 24.29 (cf. 
McEnery and Hardie 2011, 50), and has been analysed mainly qualitatively, 
devoting special attention to the words or expressions explicitly defined in 
the legislative texts. Although quantitative data are seldom mentioned in 
the text, in the research process recourse was also made to corpus lin-
guistics (cf. McEnery and Wilson 2001, 78-79), using the Wordsmith 
Tools 6.0 suite of software programmes (Scott 2012) to generate frequency 
lists for the purpose of identifying the presence and ‘weight’ of the vari-
ous lexical items and providing an empirical basis for interpretation, and 
to run concordances to help identify the contexts of usage, collocates and 
discourse prosody (Sinclair 1991; Stubbs 2001; Baker and McEnery 2015).
The basic methodological framework of this study is discourse analysis 
(cf. e.g. Brown and Yule 1983; Schiffrin, Tannen, and Hamilton 2001), and 
in particular Critical Discourse Analysis (e.g. van Dijk 1993; Fairclough 
1995, 2014; Wodak and Meyer 2001). Special attention has been devoted 
to the inevitable ideological implications in discourses dealing with such 
fundamental, intimate and still unstable issues, based on the assumption 
that language is never neutral and even the most basic linguistic choices 
carry with them an element of bias or slant, if not of outright ideology 
(Kress and Hodge 1979; Fowler 1996; van Dijk 1998; Garzone and Sarangi 
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2007; Fairclough 2014). Account has also been taken of terminological 
work shifting emphasis from an objectivistic traditional approach towards 
a more dynamic and flexible one (cf. Temmerman 2000) and of research on 
definitions carried out in legal studies (e.g. Hempel 1952; Belvedere, Jori, 
e Lantella 1979; Scarpelli 1985; Thornton 1987; Jopek-Bosiacka 2011; 
Breczko 2012; Hernández Ramos and Heydt 2017), and in linguistics, with 
special regard to a study by Antelmi (2007) looking at definitions and terms 
in legislative texts drawing on science. Reference to the by now ample lit-
erature on surrogacy has also been deemed indispensable, although most 
works dealing with it take a sociological or gender studies approach (e.g. 
Ragoné 1994; Markens 2007; Teman 2010; Pande 2011); to my knowledge 
so far only one discurse analytical study has been published, which focuses 
on language and communication on surrogacy websites (Garzone 2017).
4. Definitions
In the regulation of highly sensitive areas of life affected by recent bio-
medical advances, there arises the need to deal with notions, situations, 
processes and procedures that are new and not yet firmly established as part 
of shared knowledge. Therefore an important role is played by definitions.
Although there is agreement among scholars that in normative texts 
definitions should be given only when really necessary, there is a general 
tendency – especially in common law legislation – to provide them also for 
words or expressions that seem to have a well-defined meaning and are 
well-known. In particular, when scientific topics are dealt with, definitions 
of relevant terms are often specified, for the obvious purpose of reminding 
non expert readers (including law professionals) of the scientific mean-
ing of the expressions used or ensuring that recipients have an accurate 
knowedge of the notions involved. For instance, in the corpus we find 
definitions of terms like ‘chimera’, ‘gene’, ‘genome’, ‘hybrid’, etc., which 
have a specific scientific meaning, and are defined for an obvious explana-
tory purpose. Besides, although scientific terms have a reputation for being 
in all cases monoreferential (cf. e.g. Gotti 2003, 33-35) in keeping with 
the univocity ideal of traditional terminology, this has been shown – with 
specific regard to the life sciences – to be in many cases only wishful think-
ing, with many categories/concepts (e.g. denominations of techniques, 
and of ‘umbrella concepts/categories’) that are more adequately defined in 
prototypical terms (cf. Temmerman 2000, 63-67), and therefore need to be 
Giuliana Elena Garzone
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defined in each single case. It is interesting that one of the examples given 
by Temmerman (2000, 77-116) of an umbrella concept meeting all the 
requirements for intensional and extensional prototypicality as described 
in cognitive semantics (Geeraerts 1989; Taylor 1989; Kleiber 1990) is ‘bio-
technology’, an inherently bioethically-relevant notion. Another group of 
terms and expressions that are often defined in biolaw regard the social 
impact of biomedical advances on social life and the ensuing situations, 
roles, facts, and relationships. 
Before going on to discuss some examples to illustrate what said so far, 
a few words will now be devoted to introducing the categorization of defini-
tions usually made in the legal field, which is complex and very detailed in 
the literature (Hempel 1952; Belvedere, Jori, and Lantella 1979; cf. also, 
among others, Jopek-Bosiacka 2011; Breczko 2012). But here suffice it to 
make a preliminary distinction, based on traditional logic and dating back 
to scholasticism and Aristotle, between ‘nominal’ and ‘real’ definitions: 
nominal definitions focus on signs, and abstract the semantic dimension of 
such signs; real definitions instead focus on things and abstract the distinc-
tive characteristics of such things (Lantella 1979, 10; Hernández Ramos and 
Heydt 2017, 133). A real definition is defined “as a statement of the ‘essential 
characteristics’ of some entity, as when man is defined as a rational animal, 
or a chair as a separate movable seat for one person. A nominal definition 
[…] is a convention which merely introduces an alternative […] notation 
for a given linguistic expression” (Hempel 1952, 2). Recourse to nominal 
definitions is prevalent in legislative discourse where it is customary to avoid 
real definitions, on account of their character as statements of the ‘essential 
nature’ or the ‘essential attributes’ of an entity (Hempel 1952, 6).
Within nominal definitions, a further distinction can be made between 
stipulative definitions, which “estabish a certain meaning for a specific 
expression” resulting from the drafter’s decision “to use a specific term in 
a certain sense that may go beyond the definitions given in dictionaries 
and linguistic uses” (Hernández-Ramos and Heydt 2017, 133), and lexical 
definitions which “attempt to ascertain the meaning of a specific linguistic 
expression and which are explained on dictionaries concentrating on the 
linguistic uses of a community of speakers” (ibidem). Some authors also 
distinguish an intermediate category, “re-definitions” (or explanatory defi-
nitions: cf. Thornton 1987) which are given when the lexical meaning of 
a given expression has a degree of vagueness or is non univocous, so that 
it needs to be re-defined for a given context, selecting among the compo-
nents of its general meaning (Lantella 1979, 23, 33-34), thus providing “a 
necessary degree of definiteness” (Thornton 1987, 54). 
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Definitions have cognitive and ideological effects that go beyond what 
is necessary in order to assure precision in normative discourse. By defining 
an entity the drafter selects and imposes a certain view or conceptualisa-
tion of it. This is particularly true for definitions per genus and differentiam 
specificam, which in actual fact tend to be less widely used in common 
law systems, because of their essentialistic character which renders them 
similar to ‘real definitions’.
But by establishing the meaning of a word or expression as used in a 
normative text, a definition – be it stipulative or lexical or a re-definition – 
will contribute to establishing in society a certain view of the entity defined 
for the only fact of selecting and giving prominence to certain components 
of its general meaning, with cognitive and ideological implications. 
The fact itself of deciding to provide the definition of a certain term in 
a normative context “amplifies the importance” attributed to the relative 
entity or phenomenon (Belvedere 1979, 468-469), if only because it has 
the effect of distinguishing that entity or phenomenon from other similar 
ones, and making it subject to certain rules, and may also leave the legisla-
tive drafter some scope for slant or ideological manipulation.
This is better illustrated by means of an example. In the “Definitions” 
section of the statute of the Australian State of Victoria that regulates 
assisted reproduction, the Assisted Reproduction Treatment Act 2008, the 
first two items considered are ‘artificial insemination’ and ‘assisted repro-
duction’, and they are defined as follows:
1. Purposes
In this Act –
Artificial insemination means a procedure transferring sperm without also 
transferring an oocyte into the vagina, cervical canal or uterus of a woman;
assisted reproductive treatment means medical treatment of a procedure that 
procures, or attempts to procure, pregnancy in a woman by means other than 
sexual intercourse or artificial insemination, and includes –
 (a) in-vitro fertilisation; and
 (b) gamete intrafallopian transfer; and
 (c) any related treatment or procedures prescribed by the regulations; 
[...]
3. Definitions
[…]
treatment procedure means:
 (a) artificial insemination, other than self-insemination; or
 (b) assisted reproductive treatment;
(Victoria, Assisted Reproduction Treatment Act 2008, Part 1-3)
Giuliana Elena Garzone
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Initially the definition distinguishes ‘artificial insemination’ from assisted 
reproductive treatments, specifying that in the former technique only 
sperm is transferred “without also transferring an oocyte into the vagina, 
cervical canal or uterus of a woman”, while the latter refers to techniques 
involving the transfer of a fertilised egg in the womb.
These definitions are given although in current usage artificial insemi-
nation is normally considered to be a hyponym of assisted reproductive treat-
ment; and this is reflected in dictionary definitions, as in the following 
example:
assisted reproductive treatment n. the use of medical techniques to bring 
about the conception and birth of a child, including artificial insemination, 
in vitro fertilization, egg and embryo donation, and drug therapy. 5 (Random 
House 2016)
It is evident that in the Act under examination the legislator prefers to 
mention artificial insemination separately to make sure that it is included 
among the procedures covered, possibly in order to avoid that the differ-
ence between the two practices in terms of technical sophistication may 
lead an interpreter to exclude artificial insemination from measures regard-
ing ARTs. Of course this results in emphasis being laid on the qualitative 
difference between artificial insemination, less technically manipulative, 
and other assisted reproductive treatments that involve more complex 
technical interventions. But subsequently, the definition of treatment pro-
cedure is given which comprises both ‘Artificial insemination’ and ‘Assisted 
reproductive treatment’ and is therefore superordinate to both, although 
this is not immediately evident because the definitions are set out in alpha-
betical order and 33 items separate the first two terms from the definition 
of treatment procedure. 
Whatever the reason why they are given, the provision of these defini-
tions contributes to reinforcing the idea that there is a qualitative differ-
ence between self-insemination, artificial insemination and other forms 
of ARTs, with possible ethical and moral implications. Incidentally, it 
is interesting that this wording (“artificial insemination, other than self-
insemination”) explicitly excludes the non-medical practice of self-insem-
ination (the so called “turkey basting”, so popular with feminist lesbians 
in the 1980s), as also re-iterated in section 2.9 of the Act, which covers 
 5 In lack of an entry in the Oxford English Dictionary, Merriam Webster and other 
standard dictionaries, this definition was taken from Dictionary.com Unabridged. Random 
House, Inc. 2016, http://www.dictionary.com/browse/assisted-reproduction [18/12/ 2017].
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both “a woman carrying out self-insemination” and “the woman’s partner 
or a relative or friend of the woman, assisting the woman to carry out 
self-insemination”. The reason for this exclusion is probably that self-
insemination is considered to be a private affair, not falling within the 
scope of the regulative power of the law. At the same time, the provision of 
the relevant definition contributes to drawing attention to the existence of 
the practice and to its exclusion from medical procedures regulated by law.
5. Definitions in surrogacy laws
In this section attention will be focused on the definitions given in stat-
utes regulating surrogacy, either as such or as part of a set of regulations 
regarding ARTs in general.
Concordance lines of the verb form ‘means’, which has 212 occurrences 
in the corpus (0.33%), provide a sufficiently accurate idea of the definitions 
given in the Acts included in the corpus. For convenience in the analysis, 
without any claim of scientific validity, such definitions can be grouped as 
follows:
(a) definitions of words and expression that refer to the main elements 
(actors, actions, objects) in the process being regulated, e.g. surrogacy, 
surrogate mother, artificial insemination, etc.; these definitions are 
crucial as they are the core of the rules set out in the statute, indeed 
(following Cairns 1936), they are “rules of law” and “the court merely 
determines whether of not an event is within the rule” (Cairns 1936, 
1103);
(b) definitions of words or expressions referring to kinship, regarding in 
particular the new forms of kinship resulting from surrogacy;
(c) definitions of expressions referring to institutional subjects involved 
in the process, often indicating a ‘shorthand’ reference (Cairns 1936, 
1103) to them, e.g. Authority, court, council, registrar;
(d) definitions of expressions that in standard English have a general 
meaning referring to objects or actions, to which a specific meaning is 
assigned in the case at hand, e.g. health care provider, publish, identi-
fying information, child, etc.
In this article the focus will be on definitions of the (a) and (b) type, as 
they are peculiar to the topics dealt with in the statutes investigated here, 
while definitions of the (c) and (d) type tend to be given in any statute, as 
they are not topic-specific.
Giuliana Elena Garzone
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5.1. Definitions of words and expression referring to the main actors,
 actions and objects in surrogacy
The discussion will start from definitions in group (a), given their extreme 
importance for the impact and effects of the relevant statutes. This is espe-
cially true for the definitions of ‘surrogacy’, ‘surrogate’, ‘surrogacy arrange-
ment’, etc. as they define the main object of the Act. Therefore, they will 
be given priority.
5.1.1. UK law 
The first definition to be discussed is that given in the UK Surrogacy 
Arrangements Act 1985, which to my knowledge was the earliest Act on 
surrogacy ever passed, as the UK was one of the first few countries (indeed, 
probably the first) to regulate surrogacy arrangements in the very infancy 
of this technique, with all the difficulties involved in regulating ex novo an 
area of human life that is highly sensitive and touches a moral nerve. The 
purpose of the Act was to prohibit commercial surrogacy, and at the same 
time permit altruistic surrogacy. Very few important amendments have 
been made in the law in the over-30-year period that has elapsed since, 
apart from providing a mechanism for the transfer of legal parenthood 
from surrogates to intended parents (cf. sub-section 30 of the 1990 Act) 
and recognising in 2008 that intended parents may legitimately comprise 
people other than married heterosexual couples [cf. Human Fertilisation 
and Embryology Act 2008 54(2)].
This is the definition of “surrogacy” given in the current version of 
the Act with deletions indicated by means of barred text and insertions by 
underlined text:
(2) “Surrogate mother” means a woman who carries a child in pursuance of an 
arrangement –
 (a) made before she began to carry the child, and
 (b) made with a view to any child carried in pursuance of it being handed 
over to, and the parental rights being exercised (so far as practicable) by, 
another person or other persons
(3) An arrangement is a surrogacy arrangement if, were a woman to whom 
the arrangement relates to carry a child in pursuance of it, she would be a 
surrogate mother.
(4) In determining whether an arrangement is made with such a view as is 
mentioned in subsection (2) above regard may be had to the circumstances as 
a whole (and, in particular, where there is a promise or understanding that 
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any payment will or may be made to the woman or for her benefit in respect 
of the carrying of any child in pursuance of the arrangement, to that promise 
or understanding).
(5) An arrangement may be regarded as made with such a view though subject 
to conditions relating to the handing over of any child.
(6) A woman who carries a child is to be treated for the purposes of subsec-
tion (2)(a) above as beginning to carry it at the time of the insemination or, as 
the case may be, embryo insertion or of the placing in her of an embryo, of an 
egg in the process of fertilisation or of sperm and eggs, as the case may be that 
results in her carrying the child.
[UK Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985 1(2)-(6)]
This rather convoluted definition was given at a stage when surrogacy 
was still a novelty. It was the first time that this meaning of the words 
‘surrogate’ and ‘surrogacy’ had been defined in a normative document 
in English, although they were already relatively established in language 
use (their first attestation having been in 1978 and 1982 respectively; cf. 
Merriam-Webster 2016, ad vocem). 
The wording is not straightforward and consists of a “chain” (Scarpelli 
1985, 53) of two main complementary points and some further specifi-
cations. It is interesting that the phrase being defined in the first point 
[ss. 1(2)] does not designate the practice – ‘surrogacy’ –, but rather the 
status of the woman carrying it out – ‘surrogate mother’ – and does so 
on the basis of the kind of legal arrangement the woman is in (‘Surrogate 
mother’ means a woman who carries a child in pursuance of an arrange-
ment – […]), rather than of the fact that she is the carrier of someone 
else’s baby. In legal terms, this qualifies as a re-definition of the expression 
‘surrogate mother’, as it does not simply ‘capture’ the current meaning of 
the expression, but rather “aims at giving those expressions a new and 
precisely determined meaning, so as to render them more suitable for clear 
and rigorous discourse on the subject matter at hand” (Hempel 1952, 9). 
The focus is exclusively on the legal aspect of the problem, showing that 
the legislator is only interested in the surrogacy arrangement in itself, and 
thus avoids tackling any possible ethical or moral implications. It is also 
noteworthy that the word ‘arrangement’ is used, rather than ‘agreement’, 
to include also more informal understandings.
But of course this first definition needs to be completed by a definition 
of ‘surrogacy arrangement’, which is put forth in the next three points. Ss. 
(3) states the conditions under which an arrangement qualifies as a sur-
rogacy arrangement, proceeding by genus proximum et differentia specifica 
(“An arrangement is a surrogacy arrangement if […]”) and distinguishing 
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the surrogacy arrangement from other kinds of possible arrangements. But 
in actual fact it is more correct to see it as a form of classification, because 
it does not actually put forth the meaning of the word, but rather analyses 
the characteristics of the legal instrument it designates (Belvedere 1979, 
370). It is also interesting that this definition is formulated condition-
ally (“if, were a woman […]”), thus acquiring an essentially casuistic tone. 
Ss. (4) deals with the issue of payment being an important element in the 
determination of the real purpose and character of an arrangement, and 
ss.  (5) asserts the character of the arrangement whatever conditions are 
added to it.
The sequence of these complementary definitions, with (3) illuminat-
ing ss. (2), is in turn qualified by two further points (4) and (5), while 
ss. (6) is an ancillary point and fixes the beginning of the condition of 
surrogate mother for the woman involved in it 6. The latter is the only part 
of this section where mention is made of the process through which the 
pregnancy is obtained, with technical specifications that have been added 
in a relatively recent amendment for the purpose of including both tradi-
tional and gestational surrogacy (cf. nr. 2 above), which did not exist at the 
time of the passing of the original Act as it was first performed in 1986.
The twisted form of this definition given in the British Act can be 
seen as an obvious consequence of the fact that the topics dealt with in the 
statute were new for the legislative drafter who tackled them with some 
uncertainty and took a very indirect approach, trying to avoid moral impli-
cations as far as possible, although certainly the verbosity which at that 
time was still typical of English law may also have played a role. In most 
of the legislative acts passed in various countries in the subsequent years 
(in some cases, decades after the pioneering English text) the definition of 
surrogacy given tends to be much less syntactically complex and intricate.
5.1.2. Laws in some (former) Commonwealth countries
The legally-oriented approach of the UK Act, which defines surrogacy on 
the basis of the arrangement regulating it rather than of its actual dis-
tinctive traits as a practice (medical, organisational, etc.) characterises all 
 6 Since the 1990 Act, Point (6) has been amended substituting “or of the placing in 
her of an embryo, of an egg in the process of fertilisation or of sperm and eggs, as the case 
my be” for “or, as the case may be, embryo insertion”, thus making the wording more accu-
rate. It is to be noted that the need to establish the beginning of pregnancy with precision 
is one of other recurrent problems in all bioethically relevant normative instruments, e.g. in 
abortion laws.
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statutes of former Comenwealth countries (Hong Kong, Victoria, New 
South Wales, West Australia, South Africa), apart from Canada. But in 
most cases the definition is re-organised in order to avoid the somewhat 
erratic organisation of the UK statute, with the definition of “surrogacy 
agreement” given first.
Among the legislative instruments considered the Hong Kong Human 
Reproductive Technology Ordinance, L.N. 327 of 2000 (amended in 2007) is 
the most similar to the British text. It also reproduces the ancillary speci-
fications set out in ss. 5 and 6 of the British Act (regarding respectively 
payment, and time of onset of pregnancy), but improves them to obtain 
a more logically sequential text, with the definition of “surrogacy agree-
ment” given first:
2(1)
 “surrogacy arrangement” (代母安排) means an arrangement by virtue of which a 
woman to whom it relates would be a surrogate mother were she to carry a 
child pursuant to the arrangement;
“surrogate mother” (代母) means a woman who carries a child-
 (a) pursuant to an arrangement
 (i) made before she began to carry the child; and
 (ii) made with a view to any child carried pursuant to the arrangement 
being handed over to, and the parental rights being exercised (so far 
as practicable) by, another person or persons; and
 (b) conceived by a reproductive technology procedure.
[…]
(4) For the purposes of this Ordinance-
  (a) in determining whether an arrangement is made with such a view as is 
referred to in paragraph (a)(ii) of the definition of “surrogate mother” 
regard may be had to the circumstances as a whole (and, in particular, 
where there is a promise or understanding that any payment will or 
may be made to the woman or for her benefit in respect of the carrying 
of any child pursuant to the arrangement, to that promise or under-
standing);
  (b) an arrangement may be regarded as made with such a view though 
subject to conditions relating to the handing over of any child;
  (c) a woman who carries a child is to be treated for the purposes of para-
graph (a)(i) of that definition as beginning to carry it at the time of the 
placing in her of an embryo, of an egg in the process of fertilization or of 
sperm and eggs, as the case may be, that results in her carrying the child.
It is interesting that here the word ‘agreement’ is substituted for ‘arrange-
ment’, thus clarifying the contractual nature of the kind of arrangement 
the Act aims to regolate. 
Giuliana Elena Garzone
24
Lingue Culture Mediazioni / Languages Cultures Mediation – 5 (2018) 1
http://www.ledonline.it/LCM-Journal/
Also the three Australian Acts approach the issue from a specifically 
legal viewpoint, being based on a definition of ‘surrogacy agreement’.
See for instance the first definition given in the West Australia Sur-
rogacy Act 2008:
1.3. In this Act, unless the contrary intention appears – 
surrogacy arrangement means an arrangement for a woman (the birth 
mother) to seek to become pregnant and give birth to a child and for a 
person or persons other than the birth mother (the arranged parent or 
arranged parents) to raise the child, but the term does not include an 
arrangement entered into after the birth mother becomes pregnant unless 
it is in variation of a surrogacy arrangement involving the same parties. 
(emphasis in the orginal)
It is to be noted that the Act (like the other two Australian statutes 
included in the corpus) does not provide a definition of ‘surrogacy’ at all, 
but only of ‘surrogacy agreement’, thus treating the notion of surrogacy as 
a ‘primitive’, i.e. as “a sign that is used to define and is not defined” (Scar-
pelli 1985, 53). Evidently, the legislative drafter has decided that the words 
‘surrogate’ and ‘surrogacy’ are now so common that they do not need a 
definition any more. Therefore, what is defined is only the arrangement 
set out in the surrogacy agreement.
Two of the Acts, those of South Africa and Florida, do not define ‘sur-
rogacy’ nor ‘surrogacy arrangement’, but only prescribe how the arrangement 
should be stipulated in order to be valid. In the case of South Africa, this is in 
conformity with the hard-line plain language approach 7 adopted by the coun-
try, as is also confirmed by the total absence of the modal ‘shall’ in the text:
CHAPTER 19
SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD
292. Surrogate motherhood agreement must be in writing and confirmed by High 
Court. – (1) No surrogate motherhood agreement is valid unless –
(a) the agreement is in writing and is signed by all the parties thereto;
(b) the agreement is entered into in the Republic;
(South Africa, Children’s Act nr. 38 of 2005)
All the definitions analysed so far, having evidently been inspired by the 
original English statute, aim only at providing a legally relevant version of 
 7 In South Arica the plain language concept was definitively established thanks to 
two Acts, the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 (NCA) and the Consumer Protection Act 68 
of 2008 (CPA), although the need for legislation to be written in plain language had been 
recognised since the 1990s. Cf. Cornelius 2015.
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the facts involved, whether they actually define ‘surrogacy’ or ‘surrogate 
motherhood’ or they focus directly on the arrangement regulating the 
practice.
5.1.3. Surrogacy laws in Canada and the US
The specifically legal approach to definitions found in the Acts analysed so 
far is in contrast with that found in the other Acts examined, those in force 
in Canada and in the US at state level, which tend not to be framed in 
specifically legal terms, being general or scientific in kind. In this respect 
a case in point is Canada’s Assisted Human Reproduction Act 2004, which 
provides a definition that does not even hint at the surrogacy agreement:
surrogate mother means a female person who – with the intention of surren-
dering the child at birth to a donor or another person – carries an embryo or 
foetus that was conceived by means of an assisted reproduction procedure and 
derived from the genes of a donor or donors (mère porteuse).
(Ss. 3; Canada, Assisted Human Reproduction Act 2004)
This Act actually admits altruistic, but not commercial surrogacy. Also the 
prohibition on commercial surrogacy is formulated with no reference to 
any possible legal arrangement or agreement:
Payment for surrogacy
6(1) No person shall pay consideration to a female person to be a surrogate 
mother, offer to pay such consideration or advertise that it will be paid.
(Ibidem)
What emerges here clearly is the intent of the Canadian legislator to 
regulate not only formal arrangements for surrogacy, but also any possible 
informal private pecuniary deal relating to this practice. The reason for 
this is easily understood if one considers that these rules are embedded in 
a statute titled Assisted Human Reproduction Act, which is not aimed only 
at regulating surrogacy, but more in general at protecting the health of 
citizens (and especially of children and women) from the potential excesses 
of modern reproductive technologies and genetic manipulation. So in the 
body text many practices are listed which are prohibited, and commercial 
surrogacy is one of them [cf. 6(1) above]. Thus the focus here is on the 
need to set limits to practices materially allowed by biomedical progress, 
but considered to be objectionable, with the implication that in this area 
the law has the duty and the power to prevent or stop the inconsiderate use 
of the biomedical sciences.
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All the US Acts included in the corpus (California, Florida, Illinois, 
Lousiana, Michigan, Virginia, Washington DC) feature definitions of 
‘surrogacy’/‘surrogate’ in general, or of one of its forms (e.g. ‘gestational 
surrogacy’ in the case of Lousiana) that do not have a legal focus, but 
rather define the practices as such.
A good example is the California Act (Uniform Parentage Act & Surro-
gacy 2012), amended in 2017, which not only provides a definition of ‘sur-
rogate’, but also makes a distinction between traditional and gestational 
surrogacy, and this by necessity involves some technicalities
 (f ) “Surrogate” means a woman who bears and carries a child for another 
through medically assisted reproduction and pursuant to a written agree-
ment, as set forth in Sections 7606 and 7962. Within the definition of 
surrogate are two different and distinct types:
 (1) “Traditional surrogate” means a woman who agrees to gestate an 
embryo, in which the woman is the gamete donor and the embryo 
was created using the sperm of the intended father or a donor 
arranged by the intended parent or parents.
 (2) “Gestational carrier” means a woman who is not an intended parent 
and who agrees to gestate an embryo that is genetically unrelated to 
her pursuant to an assisted reproduction agreement.
In itself the main definition of ‘surrogate’ combines a general statement 
based on genus proximum et differentia specifica with the indication of a 
exquisitely legal requisite (“pursuant to a written agreement, as set forth in 
Sections 7606 and 7962”). It is followed by definitions clarifying the differ-
ence between traditional and gestational surrogacy, which are formulated 
in scientific terms. It is interesting that there is also a differentiation in 
the designation of the surrogate mother, who is referred to as ‘surrogate’ 
in the case of the traditional form of surrogacy, where she has a genetic 
relationship with the baby, and as ‘carrier’ in gestational surrogacy, where 
she has no genetic connection with the child, therefore she is simply a 
‘vessel’ where the embryo grows and matures. This is remindful of meta-
phors often used in US surrogate mothers’ narratives like the surrogate 
is a baby machine, the surrogate is an oven (cf. Teman 2010, 35). Inci-
dentally, this same metaphor recurs in the slogan “their bun, my oven”, 
which is popular with surrogate mothers and even appears on products 
sold online, such as tee-shirts and licence plates (ibidem).
The word ‘carrier’ occurs 165 times in the corpus (0.26%), but only in 
three of the files – California, Lousiana and Michigan – and in the over-
whelming majority of cases (130) in the collocation ‘gestational carrier’. In 
this case the use of the word ‘carrier’ instead of ‘mother’ obviously implies 
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that the gestating woman may not actually be considered the mother of 
the newborn baby, but only a sort of incubator where the baby grows 
before birth. It is used in the California statute, one of the most liberal in 
the world, which permits intended parents to establish parentage prior to 
the child’s birth (and not by means of a parentage order after birth, as in 
most other legislations): this lexical choice emphasises the idea that the 
gestational mother, who has no genetic connection with the newborn, is 
to be considered merely a carrier. 
This is true also for the Louisian text, where in all cases ‘carrier’ collo-
cates with ‘gestational’; of course, the implication is the same, but its pre-
dominance is due to the fact that the Act is aimed exclusively at regulating 
gestational surrogacy contracts (§ 2718), and admits as enforceable only 
gestational surrogacy agreements where the intended parents are married 
to each other and create the child using their own gametes.
The third Act that gives preference to the word ‘carrier’ is the Michigan 
Surrogate Parenting Act 1998, which interestingly is the only one among the 
texts considered which was passed to introduce a total ban on surrogacy:
 (f ) “Surrogate carrier” means the female in whom an embryo is implanted in 
a surrogate gestation procedure.
 (g) “Surrogate gestation” means the implantation in a female of an embryo 
not genetically related to that female and subsequent gestation of a child 
by that female.
 (h) “Surrogate mother” means a female who is naturally or artificially 
inseminated and who subsequently gestates a child conceived through 
the insemination according to a surrogate parentage contract.
 (722.853. Definitions, Sec. 3; Michigan Surrogate Parenting Act 1998)
In this case the definition is based on the detailed description of the medi-
cal procedures with a degree of technicality, and introduces a distinction 
between ‘surrogate carrier’, i.e. gestational mother, and ‘surrogate mother’, 
which is a more general term and corresponds to ‘traditional surrogate’. 
Again the formulation of the definition without reference to any arrange-
ment or agreement involves the idea that the behaviour being stigmatised 
is objectionable in general ethical terms, and not under a specifically legal 
perspective. However, the types of agreements declared illegal are dealt 
with in a separate, rather detailed sub-section describing all possible forms 
of surrogacy arrangements which are prohibited:
 (i) “Surrogate parentage contract” means a contract, agreement, or arrange-
ment in which a female agrees to conceive a child through natural or 
artificial insemination, or in which a female agrees to surrogate gestation, 
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and to voluntarily relinquish her parental or custodial rights to the child. 
It is presumed that a contract, agreement, or arrangement in which a 
female agrees to conceive a child through natural or artificial insemina-
tion by a person other than her husband, or in which a female agrees to 
surrogate gestation, includes a provision, whether or not express, that the 
female will relinquish her parental or custodial rights to the child.
From the analysis of the definitions, there emerge two different textual 
approaches to the issue. One is based on texts formulated in legal terms, 
and deals with the problem as a situation that results from a specific kind of 
arrangement, or agreement, and gives less attention to the biomedical aspects 
of the process. Broadly speaking, this is the approach that predominates in 
the UK Act and in statutes in most of the former Commonwealth countries. 
The other appraoch is more general and, in giving the main definition of the 
kind of behaviour to be regulated by the Act, ignores the fact that it may 
occur as a result of a more or less formal legal arrangement, so the impres-
sion is that its focus is more on the moral side than on the legal one. 
In the next section, the focus of the discussion will shift to defini-
tions that in the classification given above (cf. § 5) fall within category (b), 
i.e. definitions of words or expressions referring to new forms of kinship 
resulting from surrogacy.
5.2. Definitions of words and expressions referring to kinship
As anticipated above, with the spread of new practices and their social 
consequences the traditional system of kinship designations has been revo-
lutionized. This has led to new categorizations and new linguistic profiles 
in the representation of the main actors involved in surrogacy and, more 
in general, in ARTs, making it more difficult to identify and categorize 
forms of kinship. Hence the need to define them, even in cases where they 
have always been self-evident. For instance, when it establishes who may 
have access to information about a child’s origins, the West Australia Act 
defines even words like ‘grandparent’ and ‘sibling’.
Most of the definitory efforts in the Acts included in the corpus, in 
addition to those focusing on the main actors, objects and actions analysed 
in § 5.1.1 and § 5.1.2 above, regard the parental figures, as the new devel-
opments have totally disrupted the traditional paradigm. A case in point 
is the traditional axiom mater sempre certa, which is not true any more in 
the case of surrogacy and other situations where ARTs have been applied 
(Wilder 2002). In some situations, the woman who carries the child is not 
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considered to be his/her mother even in case of traditional surrogacy where 
she partly shares the baby’s genetic makeup. Nor is kinship defined on the 
basis of genetic facts. Indeed, because of the ‘fragmentation of procreation’ 
allowed by modern reproductive technologies, in the most extreme cases 
of gestational surrogacy there may be five (or six) persons that could claim 
parentage: the commissioning parents, the genetic father and mother, the 
surrogate mother and her partner, if any (presumption of paternity) (Mar-
quardt 2011). In this context of uncertainty, it is up to the law to provide 
criteria to sort out parental rights and the responsibilities of those involved.
In this respect, it may be illuminating to consider the well-known case 
of the California Court of Appeal In re marriage of Buzzanca [72 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 280 (Ct. App. 1998)] which by means of a landmark precedent-setting 
decision relied on “intent to parent” as the ultimate basis of its decision and 
held that among the parties involved in surrogacy “the lawful parents could 
be identified on the basis of their initiating role as the intended parents in 
[the child’s] conception and birth”. Of course, this decision only applies to 
California; nevertheless it sets out explicitly a principle which may inspire 
any legislation wishing to introduce a statute for the legalization of sur-
rogacy in all of its forms.
Against the backdrop of ARTs and surrogacy, even the word ‘mother’ 
does not have a well defined referent any more, nor does the words ‘father’ 
and ‘parent’. It comes as no surprise that most of the existing laws feature 
definitions of the word ‘mother’ accompanied by a pre-modifier, e.g. surro-
gate mother, which is defined in six of the Acts, while in others preference 
is given to defininig the practice, ‘surrogacy’ or the contractual arrange-
ment, ‘surrogacy arrangement’. In some other cases, an ad hoc synonym 
is preferred, generating a stipulative definition, i.e. one that “establishes 
a certain meaning for a specific expression […] that may go beyond the 
definitions given in dictionaries and linguistic uses” (Hernández-Ramos 
and Heydt 2017, 133), for expressions like ‘birth mother’ and ‘volunteer 
mother’; see the following examples:
5. (5) In this Act, a reference to the “birth mother”, in relation to a surrogacy 
arrangement, is a reference to the woman who agrees to become pregnant or 
to try to become pregnant with a child, or is pregnant with a child, under the 
surrogacy arrangement.
(New South Wales, Surrogacy Act 2010)
6 (i) “Volunteer mother” means a female at least 18 years of age who voluntar-
ily agrees, subject to a right of rescission if it is her biological child, that if she 
should become pregnant pursuant to a preplanned adoption arrangement, she 
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will terminate her parental rights and responsibilities to the child in favor of 
the intended father and intended mother. 
(Ch. 63.213, Florida Statutes)
Stipulative definitions are given also of ‘commissioning parents/mother/
father” and of “intended parents/mother/father”, the latter being a short-
hand (and less brutally commercial) expression to refer to commissioning 
parents which has been introduced with the increasing popularity of sur-
rogacy. It occurrs as many as 288 times in the corpus, with a frequency of 
0.44%, against only 61 hits of the more intuitive ‘commissioning’ [parent], 
which is used in three of the Acts (Florida, South Africa and Victoria), but 
never defined, evidently being considered self-evident.
It is interesting that two of the Statutes (those of Virginia and Lousi-
ana), which admit surrogacy only for heterosexual married couples, define 
“intended parents” in the plural. See the Louisiana definition:
(6) “Intended parents” means a married couple who each exclusively contrib-
ute their own gametes to create their embryo and who enter into an enforce-
able gestational carrier contract, as defined in this Chapter, with a gestational 
carrier pursuant to which the intended parents will be the legal parents of the 
child resulting from an in utero embryo transfer.
[§ 2718.1(6) Lousiana]
Here reference to “intended parents” to include both parents in a hetero-
sexual couple is connected with the condition, imposed by the measure, 
that the baby should be generated with the parents’ gametes. This emerges 
clearly if one compares this definition with that of ‘intended parent’ (in the 
singular) given, for instance, in the New South Wales statute, where no 
similar rule exists:
4 (6) In this Act, a reference to an “intended parent” is a reference to a person 
to whom it is agreed the parentage of a child is to be transferred under a sur-
rogacy arrangement.
(New South Wales, Surrogacy Act 2010)
This definition of ‘intended parent’ is abviously formulated in legal terms, 
making this option available to any person, irrespective of sex, sexual ori-
entation, and marital state. It is interesting to compare this definition, in 
itself quite liberal in terms, to that given in the California Act:
(c) “Intended parent” means an individual, married or unmarried, who mani-
fests the intent to be legally bound as the parent of a child resulting from 
assisted reproduction.
(California Uniform Parentage Act 2012, Part 7, Sec. 2)
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This definition, which incidentally is nearly literally replicated in the 
Washington DC statute 8, is the broadest possible in terms and reflects 
the principles established in the In re marriage Buzzanca case referred to 
above. It expresses a view of parenthood that is totally disconnected from 
biology, being rather based on persons’ intentions and wishes (“an individ-
ual […] who manifests the intent”) and therefore inherently psychological 
and subjective. This a radical break with the past, indeed with the entire 
history of mankind so far, where to different extents kinship relationships 
have always been based on biological facts. And it is meaningful that in 
a situation brought about by biomedical advances categorizations should 
disregard scientifically observable parameters, giving instead preference 
to subjective criteria based on the intents, desires and aspirations of the 
individuals involved. This is part of a paradigm which is rapidly spreading 
in contemporary society, for instance in individuals’ choices in terms of sex 
and gender.
The analysis of these definitions confirms Cairns’ (1936) conceptu-
alisation of definitions as rules of law, because in the preliminary defini-
tions of the main actors involved, criteria and parameters for determining 
the lawfulness of certain actions and roles are already set out, even before 
laying down the relevant action rule which follows in a subsequent section 
of the text. For instance, in restricting the reference of the phrase ‘intended 
parents’ to married couples using their own gametes, the Lousiana text 
contextually excludes all other subjects (single parents, same sex couples) 
and all other forms of surrogacy (i.e. traditional surrogacy, where the 
surrogate mother donates her ovum, and totally or partially heterologous 
gestational surrogacy).
6. Conclusions
The analysis has highlighted the crucial importance of language use in 
legislative texts regulating bioethical issues, and in particular the funda-
mental role of definitions. In the case of ARTs, the legislator needs to 
 8 The definition in the Washington DC Act [“Intended parent” means an individual, 
married or unmarried, who manifests the intent in a written agreement to be legally bound 
as the parent of a child”; § 16-40185(16)] adds the specification of the written form of the 
agreement, while it omits the indication that the child would result from assisted repro-
duction.
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define procedures, set rules and establish limits, and necessarily does so 
by relying on notions elaborated in scientific research and ‘borrowing’ 
scientific terminology. But at the same time in legal texts the notions 
defined are categorized for purposes that are peculiar to the law. In this 
respect a meaningful example is that of the distinction between ‘Artificial 
insemination’ and ‘Assisted Reproductive Treatments’ and the concomi-
tant exclusion of self-insemination from the scope of the Victoria Assisted 
Reproduction Act 2008. This is an important aspect because, if it is true that 
legal texts need to rely on inputs from medicine and the technosciences, 
it is also true that they re-elaborate and re-categorize these inputs, and by 
applying them in public (legal) discourse they generate relevant discursive 
frames which are then circulated and therefore will likely become socially 
accepted, and part of contemporary usage.
In light of these considerations, it can be stated that deliberately 
provided definitions appearing in legislative texts, stating openly how the 
meaning of a word or expression is intended, contribute to conveying the 
drafter’s cognitive and ideological stance by upholding a certain meaning 
of that word or expression. Thus they often influence the way a word or 
expression is intended in public debate or in subsequent legislation.
The analysis of a corpus of legislative texts on ARTS, and more spe-
cifically on surrogacy, shows that in the definitions of ‘surrogacy’ / ‘sur-
rogate (mother)’ and other notions associated with the surrogacy process 
the legislative texts examined tend to take two different approaches. In 
some of the statutes, and in particular in the English statute – the first 
ever to be introduced at a time when ARTs and surrogacy were a relative 
novelty – and in other legislative texts that were inspired by it, ‘surro-
gacy’ and associated notions are defined on the basis of the arrangement 
entered into by the surrogate mother, taking an exquisitely legal, technical 
approach. On the other hand, there is another group of statutes (e.g. those 
of Canada, California and Michigan) that seem to be less concerned with 
the purely legal aspects as they rather focus on various processes enacted in 
surrogacy as a practice and the facts and situations this practice generates. 
The focus is on the legitimacy and ethical admissibility of such processes, 
facts and situations rather than on their lawfulness, their legal implications 
or on the concern for the appropriateness of the legal procedures applied. 
In other words, there seems to be a predominance of general moral con-
cerns over the purely legal aspects.
Another facet of the problem brought to the fore by the analysis of the 
corpus is the disruptive effect of ARTs on kinship lexicon, which is now 
no longer – or not entirely – based on biological elements, but on much 
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more complex, non materially observable facts. Hence the need to define 
vary basic words like ‘mother’ and ‘father’ in the statutes, with the further 
implication that in the relevant legislations such definitions will legally 
replace the traditional ones.
In light of all these considerations, it is obvious that legislative texts 
also perform an important role, having the inevitable effect of imposing 
the conceptualisations and the discursive frames they create on contempo-
rary usage and on the general public, contributing to the dissemination of 
a certain version of relevant technoscientific and social knowledge.
Within the process described here, the law receives inputs from sci-
ence, but it is impossible for it to transmit them as they are. Rather, it 
defines them according to its needs, picking and foregrounding the rel-
evant components from their broad general meaning, with inevitable ideo-
logical implications. The discourses thus generated on the one hand partly 
reproduce or reflect pre-existing scientific and/or socially shared notions, 
and on the other hand play a role in introducing new or different concep-
tions. In this way they determine how the relevant issues are perceived and 
represented in society, thus confirming the mutually constitutive nature 
of law and ethical values as pointed out by Clifford Geertz (1983, 218): 
“[Law] is constructive of social life, and not reflective, or anyway not just 
reflective, of it”. 
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